since last september we have known that, come inauguration day in may 2012, vladimir putin would return to russia's presidency, swapping jobs with dmitry medvedev, who would take up where mr putin left off as prime minister.
早在去年9月大家都已经知道，时任总理的普京将会于2012年5月迎来总统就职日，和德米特里•梅德韦杰夫调换位置，重掌俄罗斯总统职务。
yet despite the months of preparation, the process of forming a new cabinet—named on monday—was mired in confusion and delay. this was thanks partly to mr putin's lack of an overarching strategy for his new term. with preservation of stability his main concern, his campaign promises, now signed as presidential decrees, focused on spending pledges. economic reality, however, may soon require harsher decisions.
尽管经过几个月的准备，新内阁（星期一任命）的组建还是举步维艰。部分要归咎于普京对自己的新任期缺乏支配性战略。他主要关心如何兑现竞选时做的承诺——维持稳定，为此普京现在已将这项任务签署在总统法令上。然而不久他可能会对经济现实做出更艰难的决定。
there are also questions about mr medvedev's position. how much authority will he have? will he be made a scapegoat at the first sign of crisis, as other prime ministers under mr putin have been? such uncertainty meant many potential members of the cabinet were wary of joining a government with a tenuous mandate to make policy.
人们对梅德韦杰夫的位置还有疑问。他究竟有多大的职权？他会像普京以前任命的其他几个总理一样，成为缓解危机的替罪羊吗？这些不确定因素说明很多潜在的内阁成员带着模棱两可的任命小心翼翼地加入政府制定政策。
many former ministers who served under mr putin as prime minister have moved with him to the presidential administration without seeing any substantial changes to their responsibilities. the result is a sort of unofficial shadow cabinet in the kremlin that may exert more influence than the one nominally under mr medvedev.
普京担任总理期间的很多部长依旧在政府任职，他们的责任也没有太大变动。这是克里姆林宫的一种非官方的影子内阁，它产生影响力可能大于有名无实的梅德韦杰夫内阁。
the new cabinet marks no lurching shifts. one bit of excitement has centered on the apparently opposing fates of two men. first, arkady dvorkovich, a technocratic, liberal economist close to mr medvedev who has been named a deputy prime minister with wide-ranging responsibilities, including energy. and second, igor sechin, a confidante of mr putin who heads the government’s conservative, siloviki clan and had come to be the country’s unofficial energy czar.
新内阁没有转向。有两个人的命运截然不同，这个事情非常刺激。首先梅德韦杰夫的亲信技术官员自由经济学家阿尔卡季•德沃科维奇被任命为拥有广泛职责（包括能源在内）的副总理。第二，普京的密友政府保守派领袖，西罗维基派头目伊戈尔•塞钦已经成为俄罗斯非官方的能源沙皇。
rather than a post in the cabinet or in mr putin's administration, mr sechin has been appointed ceo of the oil giant rosneft. he will continue to exert considerable influence over major decisions related to the oil industry from this position, although probably not to the same degree as he has in the past.
伊戈尔•塞钦没有在内阁或者普京的行政机构中担任职务，他被任命为石油巨头俄罗斯石油公司的总裁。他会在这个位置上继续对关于石油工业的主要决策做出非常重要的影响，尽管这种影响力的程度可能和过去不同。
in coming months the two men and their allies could clash over not only control of the energy sector but the fate of a planned privatisation wave of state companies. mr dvorkovich favours this as a way of attracting investment and improving corporate governance. mr sechin is opposed because of his preference for state control over major parts of the economy, and what he perceives to be poor market conditions.
以后这两个人以及他们的盟友会发生冲突，不仅体现在对能源部门的控制方面还有计划实施私有化的国有公司的走向。德沃科维奇赞同吸引投资并且改进企业管理。塞钦对此持反对态度，因为他认为在市场状况不佳时，国家要控制经济的主要层面。
the cabinet will soon face a painful dilemma in economic policy. should it favour the handful of extraordinarily powerful businessmen close to mr putin and the managers of large, state-run companies, or the country’s rural and working-class population, which mr putin increasingly perceives as his electoral base? both groups are essential to the stability of mr putin’s rule, yet are fighting over the same shrinking economic pie.
不久内阁就会面临在经济政策上面临痛苦的困境。是亲近神通广大并且普京关系密切的少数商人？还是接近大型国有企业的经理？还是迎合被普京视为选举基础的农村民众和工人阶级？这些群体都是普京统治稳固的基础，他们现在都在为同样一块缩了水的经济蛋糕奋斗。
the interests of the former group would be best served by the accumulation of oil profits in russia’s stabilisation fund, a sort of rainy-day pot to protect members of the business elite. "it’s a fiction that we have a reserve fund available to finance investment growth," says natalia orlova, chief economist of alfa bank. "it’s really a provision to cover the inefficiencies of state corporations." the larger that fund, the stronger the signal to the elite that the state will secure their interests.
前者的利益来源最好，是俄罗斯稳定基金累积的石油收益，这是商业精英们保护伞。阿尔法银行首席经济学家欧洛娃指出：“我们要拥有准备金才能保持投资融资增长的说法是一个谎言，这其实是保护低效国有企业的条款。”准备金的金额越高，国家保护商业精英利益的迹象就会越明显。
the needs of the latter group look very different. rural folk, pensioners and blue-collar workers depend on the sort of government munificence that mr putin promised in his campaign. honouring those pledges will require spending on salaries and pensions as well as infrastructure and other large outlays. with much of the urban middle-class now lost to mr putin, this constituency is of crucial importance.
但是后者需求就非常不同。农村民众、退休人员和蓝领工人依靠普京在竞选中承诺的慷慨的政府援助。兑现这些承诺就要在工资、退休金、基础设施和其他大型开支方面投入资金。普京现在已经失去大部分城市中产阶层的支持，他们是至关重要的选民。
dealing with pressure from the kremlin to keep this group pacified without undermining the interests of the business elite will be a delicate balancing act for the new cabinet. the key economics brains trust consists of mr dvorkovich, anton siluanov (who stays on as finance minister), andrei belousov (the minister of economic development), and igor shuvalov (who remains as first deputy prime minister). all these men are strong figures with divergent loyalties and ideologies.
在不削弱商业精英利益的前提下，新内阁要应对来自克里姆林宫的压力以安抚后者，他们需要协调脆弱的平衡关系。核心经济智囊团由德沃科维奇、西卢安诺夫（留任财政部长）、德烈•别洛乌索夫（经济发展部部长）和伊戈尔•舒瓦洛夫（留任副总理）组成。这些强力人物的意识形态和效忠的人不一致。
finally, the replacement of rashid nurgaliyev as interior minister with vladimir kolokoltsev was not a sop to russia's protest movement but a reflection of mr nurgaliyev's utter lack of support within the police service. his profile was also damaged by the failure of a high-profile reform project and by a series of police-brutality scandals. mr kolokoltsev is a career cop who has earned enough loyalty from the police ranks to enact whatever get-tough orders come from on high.
最后，洛科利采夫接任前内政部长努尔加里耶夫的职位不是对抗议活动抚慰，但也反映了努尔加里耶夫在警察系统完全缺乏支持。高调改革的行动失败以及一系列的警察暴行毁了他的仕途。作为职业警察，洛科利采夫从各级警察机构获得了足够的忠诚，这样他可以从容应对来自高层的强硬命令。
the government’s patience with the protest movement, which is still sputtering along in moscow, may be growing thin. yesterday the duma passed a law that raises fines for taking part in an unsanctioned demonstration to 1m rubles (around $30,000). the kremlin had expected, wrongly, the protests to die down by now. this is another sign that the russia mr putin has inherited as president may look rather unlike the one he and his officials have previously known.
抗议活动政府仍然在莫斯科活跃，政府的耐心可能会减少。昨天杜马通过了一项法律，把参加未经批准的示威活动的罚款提高到一百万卢布（大约三万没有）。克里姆林宫曾经错误地认为到了这个时候，抗议活动该停了。这也是普京在接任总统之前他和他的同僚们不曾料到的。