当初事态的急变，让力拓(rio tinto)抛弃了与中国铝业(chinalco)的“开创性战略伙伴关系”。如今，该公司的b计划——至少就其目前形式而言——可能（或许是应该）同样被抛弃。
rio tinto's “pioneering strategic partnership” with chinalco was junked after events overtook it. the company's plan b could, and probably should, go the same way – in its current form, at least.
澳大利亚竞争监管机构希望用更多时间审查力拓与必和必拓(bhp billiton)成立铁矿石合资生产企业的计划，这是个不祥之兆。对此交易的审查已经进行了119天并仍在继续，长度上已经超过了这家监管机构在 2008年审查必和必拓完全收购力拓案时所用的116天。那次收购并未成功。澳方监管机构并非唯一对此交易虎视眈眈的监管机构。还有欧盟。而后者甚至没有为审查这项交易立下时间表。如果必和必拓与力拓联手，这个英澳矿业联盟与巴西淡水河谷(vale)会被钢铁制造企业视作海运铁矿石业中实际上的“双寡头”。与此同时，中国反垄断法第二条规定，可以要求“对境内市场竞争产生排除、限制影响的”任何交易作出修改。
news that australia's competition authority wants more time to chew over rio's iron ore production joint venture with bhp billiton is ominous. at 119 calendar days and counting, the australian watchdog has already taken longer in its current deliberations than the 116 days it took to wave through the entire (failed) acquisition of rio by bhp in 2008. it is not the only regulator sharpening its pencil. the eu has no fixed timeframe to consider what steelmakers are describing as an effective duopoly in seaborne iron ore between the anglo-australian miners and vale of brazil. article 2 of china's anti-monopoly law, meanwhile, permits remedies should any transaction “have a restrictive effect on competition on the domestic market of the prc”.
尽管力拓(rio tinto)董事长杜立石(jan du plessis)有些不耐烦，但有充分理由可以让他开始考虑（再次）退出。自从去年6月力拓同意将自己的优质铁矿石资产注入与必和必拓的合资企业以来，铁矿石现货价已经上涨逾一倍，铁矿石资源丰富的力拓从中获得的收益远远高于必和必拓——在此期间，力拓的业绩几乎比必和必拓高出四分之一。此外，由于必和必拓在其皮尔巴拉(pilbara)资产上的资本支出更多，获得的现金流更少，到签署合资协议时，该公司必须向力拓做出的“平衡支付 (equalisation payment)”应该会远低于协议规定的58亿美元。德意志银行(deutsche bank)估计，算上此笔交易预计能够产生的100亿美元的协同效应，合资企业为必和必拓创造的绝对价值几乎是力拓的三倍。就算监管机构不反对这笔交易（这种情况不太可能发生），力拓股东也应该反对。
while jan du plessis, rio's chairman, drums his fingers, however, he has good reasons to start eyeing the exits (again). since rio agreed to pool its superior iron ore assets in the jv with bhp last june, the iron ore spot price has more than doubled, benefiting ore-heavy rio much more than bhp – it has outperformed its rival by almost a quarter over that period. further, because bhp is spending more on capex and will earn less cash flow from its pilbara assets by the time the jv is sealed, the “equalisation payment” it must make to rio should come down a long way from the $5.8bn outlined in the agreement. on deutsche bank estimates, including the mooted $10bn of synergies, the jv creates almost three times as much value on an absolute basis for bhp as for rio. even in the unlikely event that regulators lodge no objections, rio shareholders should.