With oil prices back down to $50 a barrel for Brent crude, a falling gas price and its share of the European energy market declining, the Russian economy is in real trouble. The situation is dangerous because the problems cannot easily be corrected. The risk is that the economic problems could lead to political instability both within Russia and around its borders.
随着布伦特原油价格再次跌至每桶50美元，天然气价格不断下跌以及在欧洲能源市场中的份额下降，俄罗斯经济深陷真正的麻烦。形势很危险，因为这些问题不可能轻易得到解决。风险在于，这些经济问题可能在俄罗斯及周边国家引发政治不稳定。
Anyone wanting to understand the historical context for what is happening in Russia should read Restless Empire a newly published book written around a series of maps which take go back to the emergence of the Slavs some 5000 years BC. The book, edited by the late Ian Barnes who sadly died before publication, is beautifully presented and free of the biased commentary so often associated with histories of Russia. The maps in particular are fine examples of immaculate design applied to the presentation of complex data. I only wish there were more maps, and in particular more on the production and trade in energy that dominates the modern Russian economy.
希望理解俄罗斯现状的历史背景的人，应该阅读《躁动的帝国》(Restless Empire)，这本最近出版的书围绕一系列地图展开，将读者带回公元前5000年前后斯拉夫人出现的那段时期。由伊恩?巴恩斯(Ian Barnes)编辑——遗憾的是，巴恩斯在该书出版前去世——的该书版面设计精美，而且没有俄罗斯历史著作常见的偏见言论。书中的地图堪称精美设计用于呈现复杂数据的典范。我只希望有更多的地图，尤其是展现俄罗斯能源生产和贸易的地图——能源生产和贸易主导着现代俄罗斯经济。
It is that dominance which is the cause of the current problems. The facts are simply stated:
正是这种主导地位导致了俄罗斯当前的问题。简单说来有如下几个事实：
Energy is the largest single sector in the Russian economy – accounting for a quarter of total gross domestic product this year, down from a third two years ago.Energy exports account for about 68 per cent of Russian trade. Oil and gas revenues provide half the Russian government’s official budget and an uncounted but substantial amount of the unofficial funding that supports the country’s power structure. As a result of the fall in oil prices, the Russian economy is predicted to decline by 3.5 per cent this year, with oil export revenue down by $95bn, after suffering a fall of $174bn in 2013.
能源是俄罗斯经济中最大的单一领域，占到今年国内生产总值(GDP)的四分之一，低于两年前的三分之一。能源出口占俄罗斯贸易的大约68%。来自石油和天然气的财政收入支撑着俄罗斯政府一半的官方预算，以及支撑该国权力结构的未经统计、但规模可观的非官方资金。预计俄罗斯经济今年将因油价下跌而萎缩3.5%，其中石油出口收入减少950亿美元。
Russia’s immediate problem is not sanctions imposed by the west or the continuing conflict in Ukraine. The issue is economic. Most of Vladimir Putin’s 15-year reign (as president and as prime minister) has coincided with strong energy prices and growing production of oil and gas. The resulting revenue has enabled the Kremlin to keep most people happy – businessmen, the military, the middle class of Moscow and St Petersburg and even most of the wider population. But the sun never shines for ever. Too little has been done to prepare for the current downturn. The Russian economy has not been diversified and although there is a reserve fund that can provide some cushion against the fall in revenue the amounts involved are small and will soon run out if current prices persist.
对俄罗斯来说，迫在眉睫的问题不是西方制裁或者乌克兰的持续冲突。问题是在经济领域。在弗拉基米尔?普京(Vladimir Putin)以总统和总理身份主政15年期间的大部分时期，能源价格强劲，石油和天然气产量不断增长。由此获得的丰厚收入让克里姆林宫能够让大多数人满意——商人、军人、莫斯科和圣彼得堡的中产阶级，乃至大部分普通民众。但太阳不会永远照耀。俄罗斯几乎没有做任何事情准备应对当前的经济低迷。俄罗斯经济一直没有多元化。尽管该国拥有储备基金，可为财政收入下降提供一些缓冲，但其规模不大，如果当前价格持续的话，储备基金的资金很快就会耗尽。
As reported in the FT last week, Gazprom is set to produce less gas this year than at any time since the fall of the Soviet Union.” The company’s market share is falling and according to analysts at Sberbank its revenue, year on year, is expected to drop by almost 30 per cent this year.”
英国《金融时报》最近报道，俄罗斯天然气工业股份公司(Gazprom)今年的天然气产量将是苏联解体以来最低的。“该公司的市场份额不断下降，俄罗斯联邦储蓄银行(Sberbank)的分析师预计，今年该公司营收将同比下降近30%”。
Gas-to-gas competition fed by the increased flows of liquified gas (LNG) has broken the traditional link between gas and oil prices and is changing the structure of a market the Russians had taken for granted. After years of cozy interdependence with the European utilities, the company’s trading activities are under sustained attack by the competition authorities in Brussels.
液化天然气(LNG)贸易量增加所推动的天然气之间的竞争，打破了天然气与石油价格之间的传统联系，并且正在改变此前被俄罗斯方面认为理所当然的市场结构。在多年与欧洲公用事业企业惬意地相互依存之后，Gazprom的贸易活动遭遇了布鲁塞尔反垄断机构的持续严查。
The oil story is no better. Russia exports about 6m barrels a day (mbd) but each one is now worth only 40 per cent of the revenue achieved two years ago. After a small surge in the spring, the world oil price has now fallen back to $50 a barrel. None of the recent political and economic developments around the world, from the rehabilitation of Iran to the Chinese downturn, offer the prospect of an increase anytime soon. The surplus of supply over demand is considerable. Inventories have risen by 2.2mbd during the first half of 2015, according to the US Energy Information Administration and are predicted to rise by another 1.2mbd in the second half of the year. These official stock numbers probably understate the amounts actually held both by producers and by some importing countries. The market is saturated.
石油方面的形势也不好。俄罗斯原油出口量大约为600万桶/日，但现在每桶带来的财政收入仅为两年前的40%。继今年春季小幅反弹之后，全球油价重新下跌至50美元/桶。伊朗重返国际社会，中国经济放缓——最近世界各地的政治和经济动态都没有带来油价会很快上涨的前景。供应显著超过需求。美国能源情报署(US Energy Information Administration)的数据显示，原油库存在2015年上半年增加220万桶/日，并预计在下半年再增加120万桶/日。这些官方库存数据可能还没有算上生产企业和一些进口国实际持有的原油。市场已经饱和。
Sanctions and the associated isolation of Russia because of events in Ukraine may not be the immediate cause of the problems the country faces but they compound the longer-term difficulties. Russia needs to replace much of its existing production base and to expand its oil and gas industry into new regions if output levels are to be maintained. International companies may be happy to sign up to new long-term “alliances” with Gazprom and Rosneft in order to protect their existing asset base and current cash flows but they are not rushing to pour in new money while sanctions remain in place.
俄罗斯因乌克兰事件而遭受制裁和孤立，这可能不是该国面临问题的直接原因，但它们加剧了更长期的困难。要保持产量水平，俄罗斯需要替换很大一部分目前在开采的储量，推动国内石油和天然气行业拓展进入新的地区。外国石油公司为了保护自己现有的资产基础和当前现金流，可能乐于与Gazprom和俄罗斯石油公司(Rosneft)签署新的长期“联盟”，但它们不会在俄罗斯依然遭受制裁之际仓促投入新的资金。
At the same time, fears about the future of the Russian economy are encouraging a dramatic outflow of capital. Many of those who have done well in the last decade fear that in hard times Mr Putin could expropriate assets in order to keep things going. According to some estimates, the exodus of capital since the latest phase of the Ukrainian crisis began in November 2013 could amount to $300bn by the end of this year. Some physical assets cannot be moved but cash and wealth in other forms certainly can. No one is doing more for London estate agents at the moment than Vladimir Putin.Nick Butler is Visiting Professor and Chair of the Kings Policy Institute at Kings College London.
与此同时，出于对俄罗斯经济未来的担忧，资本大量出逃。在过去10年发财的很多人担心，普京在困难时期可能为了维持政权运转而没收资产。据一些人估计，始于2013年11月的乌克兰危机的最新阶段的资本外逃总额，到今年底可能达到3000亿美元。一些有形资产不可能转移，但现金以及其他形式的财富肯定可以转移。对伦敦房地产经纪商来说，眼下最大的“财神”就是弗拉基米尔?普京。
The situation is dangerous because the options for the Russian government are so limited. The oil and gas markets are being shaped by forces that neither Mr Putin nor anyone else can control. The downward cycle could take years to play out. The dispute over Ukraine is an obstacle that could be removed but even a complete and amicable settlement there would not restore Gazprom’s market share in western Europe. The deals to sell gas from east Siberia to China and others make sense but will not make money for another decade.
局势相当危险，因为俄罗斯政府的选择非常有限。塑造石油和天然气市场的力量超出了普京或其他任何人的控制能力。下行周期可能会延续多年。乌克兰冲突是一个可以被移除的障碍，但即便这场冲突得到完全而友好的解决，也不会让Gazprom恢复其在西欧的市场份额。从东西伯利亚向中国和其他国家销售天然气的协议合乎逻辑，但10年内不会盈利。
The real risk is that economic discontent will force either the existing Russian government or its replacement into a harder political stance. As the maps in Barnes’s book show Russia has spent most of its history in conflict with one neighbour or another. War, as on numerous past occasions, could provide a nationalistic distraction from the grim economic realities. In many ways, the last 25 years in Russia have been a period of relative stability. But there is no guarantee that that situation will last. Mr Putin will remember all too well that one of the major reasons for the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s was the collapse in energy prices. If anything, Russia is weaker now than it was then. Indeed, as Dominic Lieven says in a brilliant introduction to Barnes’s book: “Russia is now weaker than it has been at almost any time in the last 300 years.”
真正的风险在于，经济不满将迫使俄罗斯现政府或其替代者采取更为强硬的政治立场。就像巴恩斯书中的地图所表明的，俄罗斯在其历史上的大部分时期总是在与某个邻国发生冲突。就像昔日的无数场合一样，战争可能引发民族主义热情，分散人们对严酷经济现实的关注。从许多方面来说，俄罗斯在过去25年间相对稳定。但没有人能保证这种局面将会持续。普京将会清晰地记得，上世纪80年代末苏联解体的一大原因是能源价格暴跌。如果说有什么不同，那就是现在的俄罗斯比那时更弱。的确，正如多米尼克?利芬(Dominic Lieven)在巴恩斯著作的精彩前言中所写的：“俄罗斯现在比过去300年期间的几乎任何时候都要弱。”