opec and the voice of doom
1. the opec oil cartel is about to turn 40, and the mood in the run-up to the grand heads-of-state party in venezuela in less than three weeks' time is jubilant. not quite two years ago, oil was $10 a barrel and the cartel was on the brink of collapse. now the oil price is well above $30 a barrel, and it shows little sign of coming down.
2. but history warns against such hubris. high oil prices can fuel inflation in consuming economies, forcing central banks to rein in demand and thus pushing oil prices down again. and high retail prices for petrol can create political problems for europe's and america's leaders--as was illustrated by this week's protests in france against the price of fuel.
3. saudi arabia, opec's cautious giant, understands all this. when bill clinton met saudi arabia's crown prince abdullah this week, mr. clinton argued for an output rise big enough to put an end to these painful prices. prince abdullah has promised to "make every effort to ensure equilibrium in the oil markets and to stabilise prices." this week he revealed that saudi arabia has been quietly leaking an extra 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) on to the market since july in an effort to cool prices.
4. if that is true, it just goes to show that managing the oil markets is easier said than done. despite several saudi-inspired output increases by the cartel in recent months, the price has remained stubbornly high; this week, it soared to nearly $35 a barrel, the highest since the gulf war in 1990. as the cartel's oil ministers gather in vienna on september 10th to hammer out new production quotas, they are once again under intense pressure to release more oil, and fast.
5. to hear opec members talk, you might think that serious price relief is on the way. there is discussion of "managing" prices down through a newish price mechanism. at the cartel's meeting in march, ministers quietly agreed to a grand new plan to keep oil within a target band of $22-28 a barrel. if the price of a basket of seven opec crudes stays below $22 for 20 trading days, the cartel is supposed to cut production by 500,000 barrels a day. if it stays above $28 for 20 trading days, it will automatically raise production by the same amount. this price band has become the main topic of discussion in advance of the upcoming gathering of ministers. prince abdullah even talks of a return to a stable market within months.
6. oil traders and analysts note that the 20-day limit looks likely to be triggered again this week. a new report by lehman brothers, an investment bank, echoes the view of many: "our expectation is that production will be increased by 500,000 bpd, either through the price mechanism or through a separate agreement." when it released new figures suggesting that domestic oil-stock levels are lower than previously thought, the american government's energy information administration added that it too expects an increase of that size. adding support to this theory are mumblings from opec delegates in support of the mechanism.
7. two decades ago, in the year of the cartel's 20th birthday celeb rations, ministers gathered in indonesia to hammer out details of a clever new scheme: a mechanism whereby the price of oil would be fixed, and adjusted every quarter automatically for such factors as inflation and currency fluctuations. members had agreed on the ambitious plan, except for one crucial detail: at what price to start this price-peg crawling. the cautious saudis, the self-proclaimed guardians of the oil market, wanted a price below $30 a barrel; the hawks in the cartel, unconcerned about consumers' pain, demanded a much higher price. the en. suing bickering ensured that the scheme collapsed.
8. history may now be repeating itself. when the current price-stabilization scheme was first unveiled, punters with short memories placed big bets that the cartel would adhere to it. by mid-june, the price basket had sailed past the 20-day upper trigger. but opec did not "automatically" release 500,000 barrels. various confused and contradictory explanations surfaced from ministers, but not the oil. only at their next officially scheduled meeting did they come up with a meagre quota increase.
9. even if ministers agree to lift quotas by the magic 500,000 bpd figure, very little new oil may actually reach the markets. that is because this figure does not allow for cheating. at the moment, the cartel's official quotas total about 25.4m bpd, whereas its actual production last month topped 26m bpd. a quota increase of 500,000 bpd will serve merely to legitimize existing cheating. countries will try to cheat once again on whatever new quotas are agreed. this time, though, they will find it hard to do it: so overheated is the oil market that only saudi arabia has much surplus capacity.
10. if opec does agree a quota increase big enough to make a serious impact on prices (say, lm to 1.5m bpd), the saudis would end up producing most of that new oil. the saudis could simply pump out the extra oil unilaterally, but they will be greatly constrained by their desire to preserve opec unity. the saudis are also afraid that releasing too much oil too quickly could prompt a sudden price collapse: that was what happened when, pushed by saudia arabia, opec raised output just as asia's economies were plunging into crisis, and the price fell to $10. this will be a delicate balancing act.
11. twenty years ago, after opec's members failed to agree on a price mechanism, the saudi oil minister of the day, sheikh yamani, predicted a glut. energy conservation in rich countries and the rise of non-opec production took off in earnest. fractious infighting left the cartel in disarray. prices collapsed.
12. this week, as opec geared itself up for its birthday feast, mr. yamani surfaced as banquo's ghost, complete with doom-laden predictions. "opec" he said, "has a very short memory. it will pay a heavy price for not acting in 1999 to control oil prices. now it is too late...prices might go a bit higher this winter, but further ahead in 2001 prices will start to come down and longer term it is horrible for opec."
参考译文：欧佩克注定要重蹈覆辙
1。石油企业联合组织欧佩克即将迎来它40岁的生日，而不到三周后将 在委内瑞拉举行的该组织的首脑峰会的准备工作也洋溢着一种喜庆的气氛。 刁二到两年前，石油价格为10美元一桶，欧佩克还面临崩溃的边缘。现在油价 已达30美元一桶，并且没有丝毫下降的迹象。
2．但是历史告诉他们不能盲目乐观。居高不下的油价对消费经济的通货 膨胀无疑于火上浇油，这迫使各中央银行通过控制需求以换取油价的下降。 高昂的零售油价也会给欧美的领导人带来政治上的麻烦。本周法国因为油价 过高而举行的抗议活动便是明证。
3．沙特阿拉伯作为欧佩克的重要一员则显得颇为谨慎。本周克林顿总统 同沙特王子阿布杜拉会谈时提出欧佩克应大幅提高石油产量以促使油价恢复 正常。阿布杜拉王子保证沙特将尽其所能维护石油市场的平衡，保持石油价 格的稳定。本周他透露沙特为促使油价回降从七月起已悄然作出举措，每日 较时常多投放60万桶石油。
4．如果阿布杜拉所说属实，则事实将证明所谓石油市场的调控并非易事。 尽管欧佩克在沙特带动下近几个月宋作出了几次增产的调整，但油价仍然居 高不下，而本周更是飙升到35美元一桶，创下1990年海湾战争以来的油价 新高。九月十日欧佩克各成员国的石油部长们将在维也纳召开会议制定新的 生产配额计划，他们将会再次面临尽快增加石油产量的巨大压力。
5．根据欧佩克成员的言论，我们或许可以期待油价问题的缓解。他们在 讨论如何通过一个新的价格机制来促使油价下降。在欧佩克三月的会议上， 部长们通过了一个宏大的计划，试图把油价控制在每桶22—28美元之间。如 果七个成员国的原油价格在20个交易日一直低于22美元，欧佩克将把每日 的产量削减50万桶。如果油价在20个交易日内高于28美元，它将自动增加 相同数量的产量。在部长会议召开之前，这一价格机制是他们讨论的主要话 题。阿布杜拉王子甚至认为几个月之内油价市场即会恢复稳定。
6．石油贸易商和分析家们注意到本周20天的期限又要到了。一家投资银 行莱曼兄弟银行所做的一份新的报告表明了大多数人的观点：“我们希望日 产量增加50万桶的计划能够实现，无论是通过价格机制还是其他的协议。” 美国政府的能源信息管理部门发布的国内石油股票的新的数据表明该类股票 的水平比预期的要低，因此它也表明了增加石油产量的愿望。欧佩克某些支 持新的价格机制的代表的一些见解支持了他们的这种愿望。
7．二十年前欧佩克20周岁的时候，部长们在印度尼西亚召开会议，制 定了一项聪明的价格计划。根据该计划，石油价格是固定的，但每个季度根 据通货膨胀和货币波动等因素作出调整。成员们对这项野心勃勃的计划表示 赞同，除了一个重要的细节，即起始价位如何指定。沙特自称石油市场的卫 士，他谨慎地提出了每桶30美元的价格；而组织中的鹰派不体谅消费者的疾 苦，要出的价格远远高出30美元。随后的喋喋不休的争论导致整个计划破灭。
8．历史现在或许将重演。新版的固定价格计划一经披露，健忘的人们就 相信欧佩克会遵循这一计划。到六月中旬为止石油价格就已经超过了20天的 上限。但是欧佩克并没有自动完成每日50万桶的增产计划。人们盼到的是部 长们花样百出又自相矛盾的解释而不是石油。直到他们下一次的官方会议他 们才作出了增加配额的决定，但也是杯水车薪。
9．即使部长们同意增加每日50万的产量，真正流通到市场的新的石油也 只会是一小部分。因为这个数字并没有考虑各国所隐瞒的那一部分产量。现 在，欧佩克的官方产量总计为日产2540万桶，但上个月的实际日产量已达 2600万桶。配额的增加不过是把已经隐瞒的部分合法化罢了。无论他们就生 产配额再达成什么协议，也不过是试图再次欺骗而已。不过这一次没那么容 易了：石油市场已达白热化，只有沙特还有更大的生产能力了。
10．如果欧佩克最后同意增加足以刺激石油价格的生产配额(比如每日 100万至150万桶)，结果将是沙特生产其中的大部分。沙特可以单方增加额 外数量的石油生产，但他们要保持欧佩克团结的意愿极大地束缚着他们。他 们也担心短时间内市场投入这么多的石油会使油价一落千丈。亚洲经济危机 时在沙特推动下欧佩克提高了产量，结果油价跌至10美元。产量对价格的平 衡作用是十分微妙的。
11．二十年前，当欧佩克成员国没能就价格机制达成一致意见时，当时的 沙特石油部长亚马尼酋长预言了石油的产量过剩。富油国限制石油产量，而 非欧佩克成员国则大幅度提高产量。混战之后油价崩溃，欧佩克陷入困境。
12．本周当欧佩克在忙于准备其生日盛宴时，亚马尼又象班柯的幽灵那样 出现了。他的的预言似乎带着一种宿命的色彩：“欧佩克未免太健忘了。1999 年的时候它没有采取行动控制石油价格，它要为此付出惨重代价。现在已经 太晚了。今年冬天石油价格或许会有所上升，但到2001年价格将会回落。从长远来看，欧佩克将会陷入困境。”