In February 2005, more than seven years after it was adopted, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change finally entered into force as an internationally binding legal treaty.
2005年2月，关于气候变化的《京都议定书》在被通过7年之后，终于作为一个国际法律条约开 始生效。
The debate on Kyoto has suffered from an almost obsessive focus on first-round targets that set emission limits for industrialized countries over 2008-2012, and on the US position. This has obscured its real importance, namely its fundamental structure and the obligations on governments it embodies: to negotiate specific, binding limits on their emissions; to implement these (including efficient market mechanisms); and to update these in sequential rounds of negotiations, as knowledge accumulates, until the problem is solved. Nearly all the world has now signed up to that structure.
关于《京都议定书》的讨论不可避免地围绕着为工业化国家设定的2008 ~ 2012年的第一轮排 放限制目标，以及美国的态度。这种争论使得人们难以看到《京都议定书》的真正重要意义，也就是 它的根本结构和其中的政府义务:协商各国温室气体排放的具体限量;执行这些限量(包括有效率的市场机制），并且随着知识的积累，在此后的各轮谈判中不断更新 这些限量,直到问题最终得到解决。几乎所有国家现在都已鉴定了 该协议。
The argument that Kyoto was pointless without the US misidentified the problem. The US administrationproblem is less with the protocol itself than with any system that requires it to tackle C02 emissions seriously before developing countries do so, and with any treaty that adheres to the principle in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) that industrialized countries should lead action to reduce emissions.
没有美国的参与，《京都议定书》就毫无意义,这种说法是错误 的。美国政府的问题不是不赞成《京都议定书》本身,而是不赞成其 要求美国率先认真对待二氧化碳的排放问题,为发展中国家作出表 率;也不赞成任何拥护《联合国关于气候变化的框架公约》原则的协 议,因为这个原则就是工业化国家应该在减少温室气体排放中率先 行动。
Aubrey Meyer is wrong to argue that the 1997 Byrd-Hagel resolution offers a radical altema-tive that is a more realistic way forward. The essence of that vote was that the US would not take on binding limits unless developing countries did so simultaneously. But developing countries are adamant that the rich world must first demonstrate leadership and willingness to tackle the problem. This is an argument that 43 out of 100 United States senators accepted when they voted for the 2003 McCain-Lieberman bill, which was reintroduced to the senate in February 2005.
奥勃雷_梅尔曾说过1997年的“伯德-海格尔方案”提供了一 种根本的更加现实的替代方案。他这种说法是错误的。那个方案的 主旨在于,如果发展中国家不同时接受的话,美国就也不接受带有 约束力的限量标准。但是发展中国家坚持富裕国家必须在这个问题 上起表率作用并表现出解决这个问题的诚意。美国的100名参议员 中有43名赞同上面那种观点，投票赞成2003年的“麦克凯恩-利伯 曼法案”，后来在2005年2月这个法案在参议院里被重新提出。
The US is not alone in looking to the growth in developing country emissions as the scapegoat. Many lobbyists throughout the rich world point that way, when faced with the need to do something themselves to honor the commitments their governments have now made. Never mind that developing countries have contributed only a fraction of the increases in greenhouse gases to date, and that their emissions per capita remain far below those of the west. All the leaders of rich industrialized countries, including the former US President George H.W. Bush, agreed in the framework convention in 1992 that the first step had to be for industrialized countries to start to reduce their emissions.
美国并不是唯一一个把发展中国家增加的温室气体排放量作 为替罪羊的国家,很多富裕国家的说客在需要自己做点事情来支持 本国政府作出的承诺时，也都把矛头指向了这个方向。虽然迄今为 止,发展中国家排放的温室气体只占全世界排放量的很小一部分， 而且这些国家的人均温室气体排放量远远低于西方的人均温室气体排放量。所有这些富裕的工业化国家的领导人,其中也包括前任美国总统乔治_ H _ W ?布什, 都在1992年的框架公约中同意工业化国家应该首先开始降低自己的温室气体排放量。
Developing countries are still waiting for that. Indeed the most solid plank of the US critique has been skepticism that the other rich countries would honor their commitments.
发展中国家还在等待着工业化国家的行动。事实上美国最主要的政治观点是怀疑其他富裕国 家是否会兑现自己承诺。
Of course, if the US were willing to negotiate targets, and developing countries abandoned their view that the US must be amongst the leaders and were willing to negotiate targets for themselves, it would be a great step forward for the global environment. One of the options for nation-states to negotiate over could then indeed be something like “contraction and convergence”.
如果美国愿意就目标值进行协商，而发展中国家能够放弃那种认为美国必须是行动领导国家 之一的观点，同时也愿意协商自己的目标值，这当然会是全球环保运动的一大进步,那么各国进行 协商的一个选择就是“紧缩和收敛”。
It is still hard to see why countries would want to throw away a global framework like Kyoto, which requires only that they move on to negotiate a future round of emission targets. It sets no constraints on how those should be designed, or who should participate.
现在仍然很难明白为什么各国会希望抛弃一个像《京都议定书》这样的全球框架，这个框架只 不过要求他们能够进一步协商未来的温室气体排放量目标而已，并没有限制应该怎样设定目标或 者限定参与国。
But at the moment, the central focus should not be on the US or developing countries, but on whether the countries that have accepted targets have the means and the will to implement them. They have created the tools to start tackling climate change in earnest. They must now start using them.
但是目前，我们关注的焦点不应该是美国或发展中国家,而应该是那些已经接受了排放量目 标的国家是否有方法和诚意来实施这些目标。他们已经诚恳地协商并想到了应对气候变化问题的 方法,现在必须开始将这些方法运用到实际中了。